Within the possibilistic approach to uncer tainty modeling, the paper presents a modal logical system to reason about qualitative (comparative) statements of the possibility (and necessity) of fuzzy propositions. We re late this qualitative modal logic to the many valued analogues MVS5 and MVKD45 of the well known modal logics of knowledge and be lief 55 and KD45 respectively. Completeness results are obtained for such logics and there fore, they extend previous existing results for qualitative possibilistic logics in the classical non-fuzzy setting.
INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, a lot of effort has been put in re lating numerical and symbolic approaches to uncer tain reasoning. Numerical formalisms attach degrees of belief to propositions. Belief degrees are understood as a measure on the set of possible worlds (possible state descriptions) that assigns to every proposition the measure of the set of worlds in which the proposi tion is true. Therefore, uncertainty measures are not truth-functional, as it is welt known and established, i.e. the measure of a compound formula can not be in general obtained as a function of the measures of its subformulas.
Possibilistic logic ( cf. e.g. [Dubois & Prade, 88] 2:, and they relate it to the Lewis' conditional logic V N. They also propose a multi-modal logic based on sphere semantics to fully support possibility the ory. Boutilier presents in [Boutilier, 92] a possible worlds semantics for qualitative possibility relations and defines two modal logics, co and co·, and he makes use of two modalities to capture possibilistic logic. One corresponds as usual to truth at acces sible worlds while the other to truth to inaccessible worlds. Finally, in [Bendova & Hajek, 93 ] qualitative possibilistic logic is related to a tense logic with finite linearly preordered time called F LPOT, pushing fur ther some aspects of the previous works, specially the incompleteness of Q P L and the ptecise relation of the above modal systems with unary modalities to QPL.
It is also worth noticing that similar attempts of re lating other quantitative and qualitative uncertainty measures have been proposed in the literature. See for instance [Segerberg, 71] or [Bacchus, 90] [Ostermann, 88] too. But we present Hilbert-style systems and get their completeness. Cf. also [Nakamura, 91a, 91b] for a different approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the underlying many-valued propositional calculus is de scribed. In Section 3, possible world semantics for the qualitative fuzzy logic Q F L2 is introduced, while in Section 4 we prove its faithful interpretation on the many-valued modal MV55, also described in this sec- Fix a natural number n ;?: 2; we base our investigations over the n-valued propositional Lukasiewicz's logic Ln, as described e.g. in [Gottwald, 88] . This choice does not imply that we claim Lukasiewicz's logic be the only formal logical system for fuzzy logic. Our set of truth values is Values= {0, 1/(n-1), .. . , 1}. Principal con nectives are implication and negation, denoted respec tively by-+ and . . .,, with Lukasiewicz semantics: ..., A is interpreted by 1-x and A-+ B by min(l-x + y, 1) where x, y E Values are the interpretations of A and B respectively; occasionally we write I(x, y) for min(l-x + y, 1). Other connectives are defined from -+and-,, in particular, there are two conjunctions and two disjunctions. We have the connectives 1\ and V, interpreted by min(x, y ) and max(x, y) respectively, and & interpreted by max(O, x + y-1), and its dual Y... interpreted by min(l, x + y ) . The equivalence con nective +-+ is interpreted by min(I(x, y ) , l(y, x)). A complete axiomatization of Ln extends the celebrated axiomatization of L00 [Rose and Rosser, 58] by some few additional axioms, namely:
for 1 < m < n -1 such that m -1 does not divide .,A). We extend Ln by unary connectives (co efficients) ( i) for each i E Values; the value of ( i)A is 1 iff the value of A is i, otherwise the value of (i)A is 0. In fact the connectives ( i) are definable in Ln, see [Ostermann, 88] or [Gottwald, 88] . Finally notice that Dienes and Godel's implications are also definable in Ln as -.A VB and (1)(A-> B) VB respectively.
In the sequel, the constant True will stand for A -> A, False for -,True, and B0-formulas will be formulas generated from formulas of the form ( i)A using con nectives and coefficients. Clearly, each such a formula is Boolean in the semantic sense: it takes only values 1 and 0. (Later we introduce another class of formulas that are Boolean). We list next some axioms on formu las containing coefficients ( cf. [Hajek & Harmancova, 93] ); in fact they are provable (by definability of coef ficients and completeness of axioms for Ln)·
for * being /\, V, & , Y._, -, +-+ and t. being the corre sponding truth interpretation,
for B0-formulas A, B, C:
The only deduction rule is modus ponens. This ends our description of the underlying propositional calcu lus. the set of all formulas of our propositional logic satisfying the usual inductive conditions. We write II A llw= i for If-( A, w) = i. Concerning satisfiability, we shall write wlf-A i ff II A llw= 1. (Note II A llw= i iff wlf-(i)A.) The corresponding notions of validity and semantical entailment are the usual ones.
After Zadeh ( cf. [Zadeh 1978] , [Dubois & Prade, 86) ), we introduce the following notion of the possibility degree of a {fuzzy) formula A E Form0 in a possibilis tic Kripke model, that extends to many-valued propo sitions the notion of classical possibility measure for two-valued propositions which plays a central role in possibilistic logic.
2 Nate that this formula is one of famous axioms of the classical two-valued propositional calculus; it is sound for boolean formulas but not for all formulas.
The corresponding dual notion of necessity can be then as N(A) = 1-II( -,A)= infw(1-rr(w)V II A l lw )· The idea behind the above definition is to use it in next sections to interpret in our comparative logic QF L2 sentences of type B is at least as possible as A, being A and B many-valued, as II(A) ::; II(B). This inter pretation extends to the fuzzy (many-valued) case , in a different way than QF L, the comparison of possibili ties that is present in the qualitative possibilistic logics QP L, CO and F LPOT mentioned in the introduction section. However, it is worth noticing that other ways of extending the notion of possibility for fuzzy propo sitions have been also advocated; see [Dubois & Prade, 92] for a discussion of such extensions. Next lemmas show a characterization of possibility measures II given by possibilistic Kripke models. Proof" Note that (II4) guarantees that it is enough to produce a Kripke model f{ whose possibility coincides with II for B0-formulas. Now it is easily seen that each B0-formula . is equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form (i)p where p is a propositional atom. Therefore, we may produce a model f{ in full an ' alogy to the two-valued case: each B0-formula B is Ln-equivalent to a disjunction of maximal elemen tary conjunctions of the form (\7':_1 (j; )p;, where m is the cardinality of the set Atom, thus for each such B there is a maximal elementary conjunction C such that II(B) = II(C). Thus we construct our model from the elementary conjunctions in the usual way.
• Notice that, given a possibilistic Kripke model We enrich our language by three modalities, 0, Op and <lp (for Atom' = AtomU{p}) and define their seman tics as follows.
II OA l] w= max{ll A l l w'l w ' E W};
I I OpA llw= max{ll p i\ A llw'l w' E W}; A <lp B is OrA-OpB the corresponding duals DA, DpA and A -<p B being defined as· -,0-,A, ...., op...,A and ..., {..., A <lp -.B) respec tively.
Note that formulas OA, OpA and A <lp B take a con stant value independently of a given wE W. Thus we shall write from now on II OA II, II OpA II etc. Next lemma summarizes properties and relations among the above modalities; note that we work with models K' in which m ax( l l p llwl w) = 1, i.e. II Op II= 1. Thus it is clear that the modality Op captures the pos sibility n whereas the binary modality <lp captures the comparison of possibilities. Furthermore, the lemma shows that O P and <l P are interdefinable and both are definable from 0. So it makes sense, for our purposes of investigating the logic of comparison of possibilities, to axiomatize the D modality. This is our next task.
First, observe that if a formula A is Boolean (takes only values 0,1) then OA is also Boolean; but of course OpA need not be Boolean. Define the class of B formulas to be the class of formulas resulting from formulas of the form (i)A, where A is an arbitrary formula, possibly containing modalities, using connec tives. Thus each B-formula is Boolean.
Definition 4.2 The modal logic MVSS has the fol lowing axioms:
• propositional axioms as in Section 2 but the ax IOms
A..,_. (l)A, A-(B ___. C)-({A___ . B)-(A-C))
are postulated for all B-formulas, not only Eo formulas;
• modal axioms: The proof is standard and sketched at the end of this section.
Next step is to formally introduce our qualitative modal logic for comparison of possibilities of fuzzy propositions, and to faithfully embed it in MVS5
Definition 4.4 The qualitative modal fuzzy logic QFL2 over a set Atom of atoms has formulas built up from atoms (propositional variables) using logical connectives and a binary modality <l; models are pos sibilistic models (W, l h rr) and the semantics is
It is worth noticing that Jl A <l B II= 1 iff II(A) ::=::; ll(B). 
Finally define
Theorem 4.6 The above mapping ** is a faithful in terpretation of QF L2 in MVS5, i.e. a formula A of Q F L2 is a )-tautology iff A"* is a MVS5-tautology.
Proof • In the rest of this section we sketch a proof of the completeness of MVS5.
Recall B-formulas; a theory is a set of B-formulas in cluding all formulas (1)C where Cis MVS5-provable.
T f-C (T proves C) if there is a proof of C from T using only modus ponens (no necessitation). T is com plete if for each B-formula C, T f-C or T f-..., c. As usual, it suffices to show the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. 7 (M azn Lemma) If To is a complete the ory and T0 f-( i)A then there is a model /{ = {W, I �) and a wE W such that wiHi)A.
To build such a model we need first some previous results.
Definition 4.8 Let T and To be complete theories. We say that T and To are equivalent, written T Ri T0 , provided that for each i and
Proof: Easy, from compactness, li k e in [Hajek & Har mancova, 93] .
• Now the definition of the model follows.
Definition 4.11 For each i and C such that To f (i)OC, let Tc be a complete theory satisfying (b) in the above corollary. We define the model I<= {W, If-) such that the set of models is W = {To} U { Tc I C arbitrary} and the forcing relation is defined by
Finally, completeness comes immediately from next lemma.
Lemma 4.12 For each formula B, and each T E W,
Proof: Induction step for <> B: • Corollary 4.13 MVSS is complete with respect to the given semantics.
5
THE LOGIC Q F L2 AND A
MANY-VALUED BELIEF LOGIC
The QF L2 comparative modality <l introduced in the previous section relies fundamentally on the MVS5 modality <>p. Therefore it seems interesting to inves tigate a possible axiomatization of the modality Op itself, without needing to refer it to any other modal ity. To this end, in this section we relate our QF L2 to a many-valued version of the belief logic K D45 (see e.g. [Voorbraak] ). Our MV /{ D45 will be a subtheory of MVS5 (like f{ D45 is a subtheory of 55); if there are only two values (Values= {0, 1}) then MV K D45 becomes K D45 like MV 55 becomes 55. Moreover, a faithful embedding of QF L2 into MV /{ D45 is very easy to defi ne.
Models of MV /{ D45 are again possibilistic Kripke structures /{ :::: (W, 1�, 11'), where 71' is a normalized possibility distribution on W with values in Values that can be understood as a many-valued accessibility relation R defi ned as R(w, w') = 1r(w ' ). Such many valued accessibility relations already occur in [Fitting, 92] .
The semantics of the MV [{ D45 modalities D, 0 is as follows:
II OB II = ma xw( II BIIw l\1r(w) ), IID B II=II-.0-. B IINext lemmas show the M V f{ D45-validity of some for mulas that will be taken later as axioms of our logic. • Now we are ready to present our axioms of MVKD45.
Definition 5.6 The modal logic MVKD45 has the following axioms:
• axioms of propositional calculus (as above)
• axioms of KD45:
• (1)<>True
being E a m. e. c.
for j > 0 and E being a m.e.c.
Deduction rules are Modus Ponens, necessitation and "from A infer (1 )A".
Previous lemmas 5.1 to 5.5 prove the soundness of MV I < D45. Therefore, the rest of this section is de voted to get the completeness results for our logic as well as the embedding of Q F L2 into M VI< D45 as mentioned before. The techniques are similar to the case of MVS5, i.e. for any formula provable in a com plete theory we can build a possibilistic model where it is satisfiable. First of all we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. 7 Let T0 be a complete theory such that
Consequently, D is consistent with the set of all To provable formulas of the form (i)DB, completing this theory we get our T.
• This last lemma enables us to define our model as fol lows.
Definition 5.8 For each i and C such that To 1-( i)OC let Tc be a theory T as in (b) in the above lemma. We defi ne the model (W, lh 1r ) such that the set of worlds is W ={To} U {Tc I C}; forT E W, the forcing relation is defined by TH-( i)p iff T f-( i)p, and fi nally, the possibility distribution is given by 1r(T) = i i!JT r E 1\ (i)OE.
Completeness is obtained by proving next main lemma in a similar way as in lemma 4.12.
Lemma 5.9 For each i, B, and for each T E W,
Corollary 5.10 (Completeness) MVKD45 is com plete with respect to the given semantics.
Finally, QF L2 is related to MVKD45 in the way next theorem shows. In this paper we have investigated, from a logical point of view, a modality for comparison of possibilities of fuzzy propositions. In this sense, this paper tackles the same problem as in [Hajek & Harmancova, 93] but with another approach. Taking as reference the Zadeh's extension of the concept of possibility mea sures to fuzzy propositions, the corresponding com parative logic QF L2 has been related to two many valued modal systems namely MVS5 and MVKD45, for which complete axiom systems, Hilbert style, have been given. However a number of open questions re main for future investigation. Some of them are listed below.
(1) It would be desirable to replace axioms (1), (2) of definition 5.6 by some other more elegant axioms (in particular not dealing explicitly with m.e.c.'s). One tautology more similar to the axioms of MVS5 is (3) To find an elegant (non-pedestrian) axiomatization of QF L2 in its own language still remains. As a matter of fact, it is worth noticing that some of the axioms of Farinas and Herzig's QP L logic, e.g.
• (A<JB) v(B<l A)
are 1-tautologies of QF L2 too, so they are potential candidates.
( 4) Furthermore, one should give up the assumption that Values is finite and study the full Lukasiewicz's logic with real values.
(5) The relationship between the semantics of the com parative modality in [Hajek & Harmancova, 93] and in this present paper it is also a matter of future research.
